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Abstract 
The objective of the study is to find out the impact of audit 
quality on earnings management. The study used a sample 
of all eighteen banks quoted on the stock exchange as at 
December, 2010. Data was gathered for the period 2005 
to 2010. The cross-sectional year by year regression 
analysis was performed. Audit quality is measured by 
using audit fees and auditor change, and abnormal loan 
loss provision is used to measure earnings management. 
Though the result was mixed,  however, based on the 
frequency of results for the period of the study, both audit 
fee and auditor change were positively related to 
abnormal loan loss provision. This suggests that high audit 
fee and change in auditor tenure will aggravate earnings 
management. We recommend that auditor change should 
not be ceremonial but based on fact of inefficiency and 
audit fee from each auditor client should be monitored to 
enforce the five per cent maximum from each client as 
suggested by Institute of Chartered Accountants code of 
ethics. 
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Introduction 
Banks	generally	have	the	incentive	to	engage	in	earnings	management.	There	are	three	
hypotheses	that	explain	banks’	incentive	to	manage	earnings	(Diamond	and	Dybvig,	1983;	
Morgan,	2002).	These	include	the	customer	confidence	hypothesis,	the	asset	substitution	
hypothesis,	and	the	regulation	hypothesis.	The	customer	confidence	hypotheses	explains	
that	banks	manage	earnings	to	gain	customer	confidence	give	the	challenge	of	illiquidity	
that	constantly	confronts	banks.	The	asset	substitution	hypothesis	explains	that	because	
banks	engage	in	risky	asset	substitution	behaviour,	they	engage	in	earnings	management	
to	hide	such	risks.	Finally,	the	regulation	hypothesis	state	that	banks	engage	in	earnings	
management	to	beat	or	meet	regulations,	which	are	rife	in	the	banking	sector.		
Arguably	banks	in	Nigeria	occupy	a	very	important	position	in	the	economy	and	in	the	
financial	 system	 in	 particular.	 Bank	 distresses	 in	 Nigeria	 are	 a	 recurring	 decimal.	
Adewakun	 (2010)	 noted	 that	 the	 Central	 Bank	 of	 Nigeria	 (CBN)	 has	 identified	 poor	
corporate	governance	and	unethical	practices	as	one	of	the	major	causes	of	distress	in	the	
nation’s	banking	industry.	Unethical	practices	here	include	accounts	manipulation.		
The	Prudential	Guideline	(2010)	is	meant	to	improve	audit	and	financial	reporting	quality	
in	 banks.	 One	 of	 the	 focuses	 of	 this	 Prudential	 Guideline	 is	 to	 deal	 with	 accounts	
manipulation	 occasioned	 by	 earnings	 management.	 The	 Prudential	 Guideline	 (2010)	
regulated	 the	 tenure	 of	 external	 auditors.	 The	 guideline	 states	 that	 the	 tenure	 of	 the	
external	 audit	 should	 not	 exceed	 ten	 years	 from	 the	 date	 of	 first	 appointment.	 This	 is	
because	there	are	empirical	and	practical	evidences	that	long	audit	tenure	compromise	
audit	 and	 quality	 leads	 corporate	 failure	 (Becker,	 DeFond,	 Jiambalvo	 and	
Subramanyam	,1998;	Gerayli,	Yanesari	and	Ma'atoofi,	2011).	In	particular,	the	demise	of	
Enron	 and	 Anderson	 clearly	 shows	 the	 importance	 of	 audit	 quality	 in	 constraining	
accounts	 manipulation.	 The	 Cadbury	 and	 Akintola	 Williams	 Delloite	 (AWD)	 case	 of	
fraudulent	financial	reporting	also	demonstrates	the	relationship	between	audit	quality	
and	 account	 manipulation.	 In	 that	 case	 Administrative	 Proceedings	 Committee	 (APC)	
found	the	parties	guilty	of	preparation	of	fraudulent	financial	statements,	outright	fraud	
and	gross	negligence.		
DeAngelo	(1981)	defined	audit	quality	as	the	joint	probability	that	the	external	auditor	
detects	 an	 anomaly	 in	 financial	 statements,	 and	 then	 reveals	 it	 to	 the	 users	 of	 these	
statements.	 This	 definition	 ascribes	 audit	 quality	 to	 both	 competence	 and	 integrity	 of	
auditor.	 It	 takes	 competence	 to	 detect	 anomaly	 and	 integrity	 to	 disclose	 it.	 Audit	
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competence	and	auditor	integrity	are	difficult	to	operationalize.	However,	prior	research	
have	 used	 such	 proxies	 as	 auditor	 size,	 auditor	 specialization,	 length	 of	 auditor-client	
relationship	and	auditor	reputation	to	measure	audit	quality	(DeAngelo,	1981;	Klein	and	
Leffler,	1981;	Knapp,	1991).	Relating	these	measures	to	abnormal	accruals,	as	a	measure	
of	earnings	management	has	provided	mixed	results	(Piot	and	Janin,	2005;	Chen,	Lin	and	
Zhou,	2005;	Gerayli,	et	al.,	2011).		
The	main	objective	of	the	study	is	to	ascertain	relationship	between	abnormal	loan	loss	
provision	(proxy	for	earnings	management)	to	audit	quality	(measured	by	auditor	tenure	
and	audit	 fees.	Abnormal	 loan	 loss	provision	has	been	adjudged	as	more	suitable	 than	
abnormal	accruals	as	a	measure	of	earnings	management	for	banks	because	banks	have	
generally	 insignificant	 accruals	 (Fonseca	and	González,	2008;	Kanagaretnam,	Krishnan	
and	Lobo,	2010;	Oosterbosch,	2009).	The	study	is	unique	because	to	our	knowledge,	there	
is	no	study	that	relates	abnormal	loan	loss	provision	to	audit	quality	using	data	from	the	
Nigerian	banking	study.	Beside,	we	use	a	dummy	variable	to	capture	auditor	tenure.		
Specific	objectives	of	the	study	are	to:	
i. find	out	the	effect	of	auditor	tenure	on	earnings	management;	and		
ii. ascertain	whether	the	effect	of	audit	fees	on	earnings	management	is	significant.		
On	the	basis	of	these	objectives,	the	study	formulates	the	following	hypothesis:	
i.	 auditor	tenure	has	no	significant	effect	on	earnings	management	and	
ii.		 the	effects	of	audit	fees	on	audit	tenure	is	not	significant.		
Literature	review	
Prior	 studies,	 like	Chen	et	 al.,	 (2005),	Piot	 and	 Janin	 (2005)	 and	Gerayli,	 Yanesari	 and		
Ma'atoofi,	(2011)	examined	whether	there	is	a	nexus	between	earnings	management	and	
audit	 quality.	 Chen	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 examined	 the	 influence	 of	 audit	 quality	 on	 earnings	
management	and	cost	of	equity	capital.	They	employed	 two	sets	of	 firms:	state-owned	
enterprises	(SOEs)	and	non-state-owned	enterprises	(NSOEs).	They	find	that	high-quality	
auditors	play	governance	role	in	China.	The	role	is	however,	restricted	to	a	subgroup	of	
organisations	and	even	under	identical	legal	jurisdiction,	the	impact	of	audit	quality	(in	
the	form	of	lower	earnings	management	and	cost	of	equity	capital)	fluctuate	among	firms	
with	diverse	ownership	arrangements. 
Piot	and	Janin	(2005)	did	not	find	a	substantial	link	between	earnings	management	and	
audit	 quality.	 They	 used	 abnormal	 accruals	 to	 measure	 earnings	 management	 and	
presence	 of	 big	 five	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 audit	 quality.	 Gerayli	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 considered	 the	
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influence	of	audit	quality	on	earnings	management	using	data	from	quoted	Iranian	firms.	
They	used	auditor	size,	auditor	industry	specialization	and	independence	to	proxy	audit	
quality,	and	discretionary	accruals	to	proxy	earnings	management.	Discretionary	accruals	
showed	 a	 negative	 association	 with	 auditor	 size	 and	 auditor	 industry	 Specialization.	
Furthermore,	 they	 find	 negative	 association	 between	 auditor	 independence	 and	
discretionary	accruals.	 Summarily,	 their	 study	 suggests	 that	high	audit	quality	 is	more	
likely	to	constrain	earnings	management	than	low	quality.	This	result	agrees	with	prior	
research	 (Teoh	and	Wong,	1993;	Becker,	DeFond,	 Jiambalvo	and	 	 Subramanyam,	1998;	
Rusmin	2010;		Francis,	Maydew	and	Sparks,	1999;	Li	and	Lin,	2005).	Further	indications	
of	the	negative	link	between	audit	quality	and	size	of	abnormal	accruals	is	provided	by	the	
studies	of	Ebrahim	(2001)	and	Tendeloo		and	Vanstraelen	(2001).			
Carcello	and	Nagy	(2004)	find	that	dishonest	financial	reporting	arises	early	in	an	auditor-
client	 affiliation.	 Geiger	 and	 Raghunandan	 (2002)	 finds	 that	 corporate	 failure	 occurs	
considerably	more	 often	 in	 the	 first	 five	 years	 of	 an	 auditor-client	 association.	Myers,	
Myers	and	Omer	(2003)	find	that	risky	accounting	choices	are	inhibited	more	effectively	
by	 longer	 auditor	 term.	 	 In	 conclusion,	Gosh	 and	Moon	 (2005)	 find	 that	 investors	 and	
rating	agencies	depend	on	audited	financial	reports	more	strongly	as	auditor	tenure	rises.	
These	studies	suggest	that	longer	auditor	tenure	increases	audit	quality	and	by	extension	
the	lowers	earnings	management	propensity.		
However,	 standard	 setters	 and	 regulatory	 authorities	 believe	 that	 longer	 audit	 tenure	
encourages	earnings	management.	They	therefore	make	audit-client	rotation	mandatory.	
In	the	United	States,	the	Sabane-Oxley	Act	2002	reduced	the	auditor	tenure	from	seven	to	
five	years.	While	 the	Prudential	Guideline	2010	 in	Nigeria	 limits	auditor	 tenure	 to	 ten	
years	and	the	European	Commission	limits	it	to	seven-year.		
Audit	 fee	 is	 often	 used	 to	 proxy	 auditor	 independence	 and	 hence	 audit	 quality.		
Kanagaretnam	et	al.	 (2010)	examine	auditor	 independence	 in	 the	banking	 industry	by	
analysing	 the	 relation	 between	 fees	 paid	 to	 auditors	 and	 the	 extent	 of	 earnings	
management	through	loan	loss	provisions	LLP.	They	find	that	unexpected	audit	fees	are	
unrelated	 to	 earnings	management	 for	 large	banks.	 For	 small	 banks,	 they	 find	 greater	
earnings	management	via	under-provisioning	of	LLP	by	banks	that	pay	higher	unexpected	
total	and	non-audit	fees	to	the	auditor.	Their	results	suggest	that	auditor	fee	dependence	
on	the	audit	client	 is	associated	with	earnings	management	via	abnormal	LLP	and	 is	a	
potential	threat	to	auditor	independence	for	small	banks.		
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III.	Data	and	method	
The	data	is	drawn	from	pre-IFRS	(International	Financial	Reporting	Standard)	adoption	
financial	 reports	 of	 all	 the	 18	 banks	 quoted	 on	 the	 Nigerian	 Stock	 Exchange	 as	 at	 31	
December,	2010.	The	data	was	sourced	manually	from	publicly	available	annual	reports	
for	period	2005	to	2010.	We	use	pre-IFRS	period	to	exclude	the	impact	of	adoption	of	IFRS	
on	the	quality	of	financial.		
The	study	uses	a	multiple	regression	model.	Regression	analyses	were	done	year	by	year	
for	the	six	year	period,	2005-2010.	Our	result	is	based	on	the	frequency	of	the	relationship	
between	 the	 dependent	 and	 independent	 variables	 as	 revealed	 by	 the	 year	 by	 year	
regression	analyses.		
IV.	Model	specification	
Our	model	relates	audit	quality	to	earnings	management.	Audit	quality	is	the	independent	
variable.	Audit	fees	and	auditor	change	is	used	as	measures	of	audit	quality	(See	Gerayli	
et	al.,	2011,	and	CBN	Prudential	Guideline,	2010).	Following	Kanagaretnam	et	al.	(2010),	
we	define	proxy	 earnings	management	using	 abnormal	 loan	 loss	provision	 and	define	
abnormal	loan	loss	provision	as	follows:	
Model	1	Abnormal	loan	loss	provision	
	
	  = ∝+ 	
 +  
 +  ∆ +   + ∆ +   +
      ………………………………………………………………………………….…..…(1) 
 
ℎ 
 =      ! "  " 
           
 =  − $%& "  ! !ℎ "  " 
              ∆ = 'ℎ"    − $%& "     
             = ! () * + !! − %% 
           ∆ = 'ℎ"   !!* * 
               = !!* *  
                      =  !& 
,,	and	    $&! > 0  
We specify our model as follows: 
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Model	2:	Earnings	management	and	audit	quality	
The	model	for	relating	earnings	management	to	audit	quality	is	given	below:	
	

 =  ∅ +  ∅	
/0122 +  ∅
/0'3
+ 4 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . … . . … . . (2) 
 
Where: ABLL	=	Abnormal	Loan	loss	Provision	
          
/0122 = !* 
:) ! 1		
             
/0'3 = 
:) !  'ℎ"		
4 =  !&		
∅	, )  ∅  $&!  
    4 =  !& 
 
Measurement of Variables 
Table 1 defines the variables for the study and their measurements. 
Table	1	Measurement	of	Variables		
ABLL	 Abnormal	 Loan	
Loss	Provision	
Difference	 between	 total	 loan	 loss	
and	normal	loan	loss	
	
	
Kanagaretnam	 et	 al.	
(2010)	

/0122	 !* 
:) ! 1	 Natural	 log	 total	audit	 fees	paid	by	
bank	as	disclosed	in	annual	report	
Gerayli	et	al.,	2011	

/0'3	 
:) ! <ℎ"	 Dichotomous	 variable,	 1	 if	 Auditor	
was	 change	 in	 the	 year	 and	 0	
otherwise	
CBN	 Prudential	
Guideline,	2010	
Source:	Authors’	Compilation	
V.	Results	and	discussion	
Earnings	management	and	auditor	change	
The	results	of	the	regression	are	shown	in	table	1	and	2.	The	relationship	between	auditor	
change	and	abnormal	loan	loss	provision	is	positive	except	for	2005	and	2010,	where	it	is	
negative.	 Our	 result	 is	mixed,	 though	 the	 frequency	 of	 positive	 relationships	 between	
abnormal	loan	loss	provision	and	audit	change	is	more.	A	positive	relationship	between	
abnormal	 loan	loss	provision	and	auditor	change,	as	the	frequency	of	the	results	show,	
implies	that	a	change	in	auditor	increases	tendency	for	earnings	management.	A	positive	
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relationship	between	auditor	change	and	earning	management	is	supported	by	Gul,	Chen,	
Tsui,	and	Judy	(2003)	and	Abbott,	Paker	and	Peters	(2000).		Johnson,	Daily	and	Ellstrand	
(1996)	suggest	that	auditor	change	lowers	audit	quality.	They	find	that	short	audit	tenure	
lowers	audit	quality;	implying	that	a	change	in	auditor	is	not	desirable.			
The	 results,	 although	mixed,	 is	 not	 significant.	 This	 study	 therefore	 supports	 the	 first	
hypothesis	that:	
Auditor	tenure	has	no	significant	effect	on	earnings	management	
Table	1	Regression	results	for	2005-2007	
	 2005	 2006	 2007	
VARIABLES:		 Coef	 p-value	 Coef	 p-value	 Coef	 P-value	
			AUDCH	 -
8.65E+08	
0.27	 5.44E+08	 0.25	 6.81E+08	 0.38	
			AUDFEE	 22883153	 0.44	 1210292	 0.01	 -38709	 0.87	
R2	 	 0.17	 	 0.40	 	 0.17	
Adjusted	R2	 	 -0.02	 	 0.26	 	 -0.02	
F-statistic	 	 0.88	 	 2.83	 	 0.91	
P-value	 	 (0.47)	 	 (0.07)	 	 (0.46)	
DW-stat	 	 1.89	 	 2.16	 	 2.03	
Source:	Author’s	Computation	using	E-views	7.0	
Earnings	management	and	audit	fee	
Audit	fee	is	positively	related	to	abnormal	loan	loss	provision	for	the	period	studied	except	
for	2007	and	2009.	A	positive	relationship	between	audit	fee	and	earning	management	
implies	that	higher	audit	fees	tend	to	aggravate	earnings	management.	This	is	explainable	
by	the	concept	of	economic	bonding.	When	the	auditor	receives	enormous	fees	from	the	
client,	there	is	a	tendency	for	the	auditor	to	acquiesce	when	the	client	adopts	unacceptable	
accounting	rules	to	prepare	financial	statements.	Srinidhi	and	Gul	(2007)	find	that	there	
is	a	positive	relationship	between	audit	fees	and	accrual	quality.	Moreover,	Gosh	and	Moon	
(2005)	posits	that	audit	fee	has	a	negative	impact	on	audit	quality.		
The	study	provides	mixed	results	of	the	relationship	between	earnings	management	and	
audit	 fee.	 However,	 the	 result	 is	 not	 significant.	 The	 study	 there	 supports	 the	 second	
hypothesis	that:	
the	effects	of	audit	fees	on	audit	tenure	is	not	significant.		
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Table 2 Regression results for 2008-2010 
 2008 2009 2010 
VARIABLES:  Coef p-value Coef. p-value Coef p-value 
   AUDCH 2.71E+09 0.42 1.70E+10 0.32 -7.53E+09 0.31 
   AUDFEE 6982058 0.89 -
61964660 
0.61 9.31E+07 0.33 
R2  0.04  0.12  0.16 
Adjusted R2  -0.08  -0.09  0.00 
F-statistic  0.34  0.57  0.81 
P-value  (0.71)  (0.64)  (0.50) 
DW-stat  1.69  1.86  1.90 
Source: Author’s Computation using E-views 7.0 
Conclusion and recommendations 
The	 study	 shows	 the	 inconclusiveness	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 audit	 quality	 and	
earnings	management.	This	inconclusiveness	suggests	the	need	for	improving	method	of	
analysis	and	developing	new	proxies	for	audit	quality	and	earnings	management.	Using	
audit	 fee	and	auditor	 change	as	proxy	 for	audit	quality	has	provided	 researchers	with	
mixed	results.	Probably	a	better	measure	of	audit	quality	would	be	from	the	viewpoint	of	
the	audit	firm.	A	measure	of	audit	quality	that	combines	auditor	competence	and	auditor	
independence	 is	 recommended.	 Moreover,	 abnormal	 loss	 provision	 may	 not	 capture	
earnings	management	properly.	Doing	the	same	study	using	post	IFRS	data,	may	improve	
the	consistency	of	results	as	IFRS	is	meant	to	narrow	the	latitude	in	accounting	rules.	
We	recommend	that	based	on	our	findings	that	audit	fees	should	be	monitored	to	ensure	
that	no	audit	 firm	has	a	client	whose	audit	 fee	exceeds	more	than	five	per	cent	of	total	
audit	 fee	 as	 suggested	 by	 the	 Institute	 of	 Chartered	 Accountants	 of	 Nigerian	 code	 of	
conduct	for	professional	accountants.	Significantly	high	audit	fees	from	an	audit	client	will	
result	in	economic	bonding	which	will	jeopardize	auditor	independence	and	audit	quality.					
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APPENDIX	1	REGRESSION	RESULTS 
REGRESSION	RESULT	Earnings	management	and	Audit	Quality	(Abnormal	loan	loss	
provision	as	dependent	variable)	2005	
Dependent Variable: ABLL 
   
Method: Least Squares 
   
Date: 09/07/14   Time: 16:15 
  
Sample (adjusted): 2 18 
   
Included observations: 17 after adjustments 
 
Convergence achieved after 2 iterations 
  
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
AUDCH -8.65E+08 7.46E+08 -1.158917 0.2673 
AUDFEE 22883153 28761306 0.795623 0.4405 
C 2.02E+08 1.13E+09 0.17811 0.8614 
AR(1) -0.219795 0.310683 -0.707458 0.4918 
     
R-squared 0.169562     Mean dependent var 27788498 
Adjusted R-squared -0.022078     S.D. dependent var 1.01E+09 
S.E. of regression 1.02E+09     Akaike info criterion 44.53569 
Sum squared resid 1.37E+19     Schwarz criterion 44.73174 
Log likelihood -374.5534     Hannan-Quinn criter. 44.55518 
F-statistic 0.884794     Durbin-Watson stat 1.888908 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.474565 
   
     
Inverted AR Roots -0.22 
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REGRESSION RESULT Earnings management and Audit Quality (Abnormal loan loss 
provision as dependent variable) 2006  
Dependent	Variable:	ABLL	
	 	 	
Method:	Least	Squares	
	 	 	
Date:	09/07/14			Time:	17:32	
	 	 	
Sample	(adjusted):	2	18	
	 	 	
Included	observations:	17	after	adjustments	
	 	
Convergence	achieved	after	21	iterations	
	 	
White	heteroskedasticity-consistent	standard	errors	&	covariance	
	 	 	 	 	
Variable	 Coefficient	 Std.	Error	 t-Statistic	 Prob.			
	 	 	 	 	
C	 -8.71E+08	 3.87E+08	 -2.249074	 0.0425	
AUDCH	 5.44E+08	 4.53E+08	 1.201248	 0.2511	
AUDFEE	 1210292	 359377.8	 3.367744	 0.005	
AR(1)	 -0.425735	 0.181602	 -2.344323	 0.0356	
	 	 	 	 	
R-squared	 0.39518	 				Mean	dependent	var	 -3.96E+08	
Adjusted	R-squared	 0.255606	 				S.D.	dependent	var	 7.75E+08	
S.E.	of	regression	 6.68E+08	 				Akaike	info	criterion	 43.68119	
Sum	squared	resid	 5.81E+18	 				Schwarz	criterion	 43.87724	
Log	likelihood	 -367.2901	 				Hannan-Quinn	criter.	 43.70067	
F-statistic	 2.83133	 				Durbin-Watson	stat	 2.156609	
Prob(F-statistic)	 0.079605	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Inverted	AR	Roots	 -0.43	
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REGRESSION RESULT Earnings management and Audit Quality (Abnormal loan loss 
provision as dependent variable) 2007  
Dependent	Variable:	ABLL	
	 	 	
Method:	Least	Squares	
	 	 	
Date:	09/07/14			Time:	18:59	
	 	 	
Sample	(adjusted):	2	18	
	 	 	
Included	observations:	17	after	adjustments	
	 	
Convergence	achieved	after	17	iterations	
	 	 	
White	heteroskedasticity-consistent	standard	errors	&	covariance	
	
	 	 	 	 	
Variable	 Coefficient	 Std.	Error	 t-Statistic	 Prob.			
	 	 	 	 	
C	 -4.74E+08	 6.67E+08	 -0.71037	 0.49	
AUDCH	 6.81E+08	 7.55E+08	 0.902446	 0.3832	
AUDFEE	 -38709	 243043	 -0.15927	 0.8759	
AR(1)	 -0.280727	 0.253904	 -1.10564	 0.2889	
	 	 	 	 	
R-squared	 0.173359	 				Mean	dependent	var	 99198670	
Adjusted	R-squared	 -0.017405	 				S.D.	dependent	var	 1.05E+09	
S.E.	of	regression	 1.05E+09	 				Akaike	info	criterion	 44.59341	
Sum	squared	resid	 1.45E+19	 				Schwarz	criterion	 44.78946	
Log	likelihood	 -375.044	 				Hannan-Quinn	criter.	 44.61289	
F-statistic	 0.908762	 				Durbin-Watson	stat	 2.030198	
Prob(F-statistic)	 0.463526	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Inverted	AR	Roots	 -0.28	
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REGRESSION RESULT Earnings management and Audit Quality (Abnormal loan loss 
provision as dependent variable) 2008  
Dependent	Variable:	ABBL	
	 	 	
Method:	Least	Squares	
	 	 	 	
Date:	09/07/14			Time:	20:11	
	 	 	
Sample:	1	18	
	 	 	 	
Included	observations:	18	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Variable	 Coefficient	 Std.	Error	 t-Statistic	 Prob.			
	 	 	 	 	
C	 -3.15E+09	 5.85E+09	 -0.537991	 0.5985	
AUDCH	 2.71E+09	 3.27E+09	 0.828903	 0.4202	
AUDFEE	 6982058	 53382096	 0.130794	 0.8977	
	 	 	 	 	
R-squared	 0.04391	 				Mean	dependent	var	 -2.63E+08	
Adjusted	R-squared	 -0.083569	 				S.D.	dependent	var	 4.95E+09	
S.E.	of	regression	 5.15E+09	 				Akaike	info	criterion	 47.7127	
Sum	squared	resid	 3.98E+20	 				Schwarz	criterion	 47.86109	
Log	likelihood	 -426.4143	 				F-statistic	 0.344449	
Durbin-Watson	stat	 1.690528	 				Prob(F-statistic)	 0.714071	
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REGRESSION RESULT Earnings management and Audit Quality (Abnormal loss 
provision as dependent variable) 2009  
Dependent	Variable:	ABLL	
	 	 	
Method:	Least	Squares	
	 	 	
Date:	09/07/14			Time:	21:43	
	 	 	
Sample(adjusted):	2	18	
	 	 	
Included	observations:	17	after	adjusting	endpoints	
	
Convergence	achieved	after	8	iterations	
	 	
White	Heteroskedasticity-Consistent	Standard	Errors	&	Covariance	
	 	 	 	 	
Variable	 Coefficient	 Std.	Error	 t-Statistic	 Prob.			
	 	 	 	 	
C	 -9.40E+09	 1.13E+10	 -0.82846	 0.4224	
AUDFEE	
-
61964660	 1.19E+08	 -0.52106	 0.6111	
AUDCH	 1.70E+10	 1.65E+10	 1.033195	 0.3204	
AR(1)	 0.349967	 0.449102	 0.779259	 0.4498	
	 	 	 	 	
R-squared	 0.116779	 				Mean	dependent	var	 -3.05E+08	
Adjusted	R-squared	 -0.087042	 				S.D.	dependent	var	 1.30E+10	
S.E.	of	regression	 1.35E+10	 				Akaike	info	criterion	 49.69534	
Sum	squared	resid	 2.38E+21	 				Schwarz	criterion	 49.89139	
Log	likelihood	 -418.4104	 				F-statistic	 0.572949	
Durbin-Watson	stat	 1.859165	 				Prob(F-statistic)	 0.642759	
	 	 	 	 	
Inverted	AR	Roots	 0.35	
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REGRESSION RESULT Earnings management and Audit Quality (Abnormal loss 
provision as dependent variable) 2010  
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ABLL 
    
Method: Least Squares 
    
Date: 09/07/14   Time: 19:54 
    
Sample(adjusted): 2 18 
    
Included observations: 17 after adjusting endpoints 
  
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
t-
Statistic Prob.   
 
      
C 3.30E+10 3.90E+10 0.8475 0.4121 
 
AUDFEE 9.31E+07 9.25E+07 1.006 0.3328 
 
AUDCOM -7.53E+09 7.12E+09 -1.058 0.3094 
 
AR(1) 0.238377 0.294821 0.8085 4.33E-01 
 
      
R-squared 1.59E-01     Mean dependent var -1.11E+09 
 
Adjusted R-squared -3.52E-02     S.D. dependent var 1.62E+10 
 
S.E. of regression 1.65E+10     Akaike info criterion 50.09396 
 
Sum squared resid 3.54E+21     Schwarz criterion 50.29001 
 
Log likelihood -421.7987     F-statistic 0.818791 
 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.859095     Prob(F-statistic) 0.506312 
 
